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Abstract:  Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for 
phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and 
agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is 
impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans 
and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal 
consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible 
contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its 
implications for potential suffering, might also be part of the simulated perceptual conscious 
world that K & B propose. 
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Klein & Barron (2016; henceforth K & B) follow Merker’s (2007) suggestion that dynamic 
integration of sensory information about the environment and the organism’s place in it, 
together with information about the organism’s current homeostatic requirements, 
generates a neural model that provides a “unique, unified perspective on the world” (K & B, 
p. 3) and produces consciousness. Merker argues that the vertebrate (human) midbrain is 
necessary and sufficient for consciousness, and that it embodies the neural simulation 
described above, integrating information from different decision-making domains — 
motivation, target (goal) selection, and action selection via a common-currency “conscious 
mode of function” (Merker, p. 71). K & B contend that the functional architecture of the 
insect brain has many parallels with that of the vertebrate midbrain and is thus capable of 
the same neural modelling, and hence of conscious experience.  
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But is consciousness a necessary corollary of neural computations of this sort -- and does 
evidence of a similar functional architecture in human and insect brains inevitably imply a 
similar capacity for conscious experience? Even in humans, “blindsight” patients who are 
unable to report consciously seeing anything in their impaired visual field can exhibit precise 
real-time visually guided action and target selection (e.g., fine-tuning grasp to target size; 
avoiding obstacles). Interestingly, when a short delay is introduced between visual access to 
the task and task performance, these patients fail to fine-tune their movements or avoid 
obstacles; hence under these circumstances conscious experience is required (Striemer et 
al., 2009; Whitwell et al., 2011). Although damage to cortical pathways is involved in these 
phenomena, and there is debate as to whether blindsight patients truly lack phenomenal 
awareness in their impaired visual field (e.g., Merker), these findings raise the possibility that 
insects show neural coordination of motivation, target selection and action in the absence of 
conscious experience, at least in real-time. This possibility could be countered by good 
performance in tasks where there is a delay between target selection and action or goal 
acquisition. Sophisticated detour behaviour by jumping spiders hunting prey (Tarsitano & 
Jackson, 1997) may provide one such example. 
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, we find K & B’s proposal engaging and persuasive. We 
will now consider the potential contents of insect consciousness, should K & B turn out to be 
right. Although they avoid detailed consideration of this issue, K & B’s approach, like 
Merker’s, emphasises a perceptual, visual perspective. Merker (p. 72) speculates that “in its 
primitive beginnings, the ‘world’ of the proposed neural reality simulator presumably 
amounted to no more than a two-dimensional screen-like map of spatial directions on which 
potential targets might appear as mere loci of motion in an otherwise featureless noise field, 
defined more by their displacement than by any object features.” Such imaginings of the 
contents of subjective experience appear to sit well with K & B’s arguments for insect 
consciousness. Although predominantly visual, the same principles could conceivably be 
applied to a simulated world dominated by olfactory or auditory inputs.  
 
Within this simulated world, K & B (p. 5) note that “The motivational and physiological states 
of the organism prioritize target and action selection.” Goal prioritization and decision-
making involve reward and punishment valuation mechanisms, adding an affective 
dimension to the simulation and, potentially, to the contents of consciousness. A primarily 
perceptually based consciousness could incorporate valuation of targets in a purely visual 
way by representing important goals as larger or more intense visual signals in the simulated 
world. Alternatively, affective consciousness – positively or negatively valenced feelings 
induced by fitness-enhancing or threatening stimuli – may have preceded perceptual 
experience as a common currency for evaluating different courses of action across 
functionally distinct domains (Cabanac, 1992; Mendl et al., 2010). Or both perceptual and 
affective consciousness may have emerged simultaneously as components of the simulated 
world. 
 
If either of the latter two scenarios applies in insects, the capacity for consciousness 
suggested by K & B would include subjective experience of affect (e.g., emotions), thus 
raising the possibility that insects can suffer, something that researchers and non-scientists 
think unlikely (Paul, 1995). The implications would therefore be significant, particularly 
ethically: At present insects are given no legal protection at all from harm. What is the 
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evidence that affective consciousness may be part of the simulated world proposed by K & 
B? 
 
Darwin (2009/1872, p. 347) attributed human-like emotions to insects: “Even insects express 
anger, terror, jealousy and love, by their stridulation.” For him, the functional and 
behavioural similarities between human and animal behaviour in emotive situations (e.g., in 
response to the arrival of a reward or a punisher) implied similarly subjective emotional 
experiences. Insects certainly show behavioural responses that resemble the fundamental 
features of emotions. Anderson & Adolphs (2014) call these “emotion primitives,” listing 
elements such as valence, scalability, and persistence as being critical for assigning emotion-
like states to non-human animals. Fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster), for example, show 
freezing and avoidance of a repeated looming shadow that becomes more intense with 
repeated exposure, and persists across time even after the shadow is removed. Gibson et al. 
(2015) argue that this reflects an emotion-like “internal defensive state” (p. 1401). 
 
Perhaps more compelling than immediate responses to stimuli is evidence that animals have 
background affective states, or “moods,” that function to moderate responses to events and 
guide decision-making, particularly under ambiguity. We (Mendl et al., 2010) hypothesize 
that an animal’s past experiences of reward and punishment across a range of functional 
domains (e.g., foraging, predator avoidance, intra-specific competition) determine its 
current mood state. Assuming a correlation between past experience and future probability 
of rewards and punishers, individuals can then make use of their mood state to “best guess” 
whether a novel or ambiguous stimulus is likely to be good or bad news; a negative mood 
should lead to enhanced expectation of punishment and/or decreased expectation of 
reward, resulting in cautious or “pessimistically” biased judgements of ambiguity (see also 
Nettle & Bateson, 2012). Honeybees, like a wide range of vertebrate species (Harding et al., 
2004; Mendl et al., 2009; Gygax, 2014; Roelofs et al., 2016), show such affect-induced 
judgement biases (Bateson et al., 2011). Humans appear to make such judgements by 
reflecting on their subjective feelings, using the “how do I feel about it?” heuristic (Schwartz 
& Clore, 1983; Paul et al., 2005). This raises the possibility that affective consciousness plays 
a role in biasing judgements in insects and other invertebrates too.  
 
Although these examples are suggestive of affect-like states in insects, they do not provide 
conclusive evidence of conscious affective experience. Even in humans, there is no one-to-
one correspondence between reported emotional feelings and the behavioural and 
physiological components of emotional states. For example, Winkielman et al. (2005) found 
that participants viewing emotionally salient images showed behaviour indicative of an 
altered affective state (enhanced “liking” of a sweet drink, expressed through willingness to 
drink more and pay more for it) despite the absence of any change in subjectively 
experienced pleasure when consuming the drink. In terms of affect-induced judgement 
biases, it is possible to conceive a neural mechanism that reflects cumulative experience of 
reward and punishment and interfaces with action selection processes without needing to 
invoke conscious experience (Mendl et al., 2011). A candidate is changes in tonic firing of PPL 
and PAM dopaminergic neurones that code the valence of sensory input and moderate the 
balance of approach and avoidance tendencies in D. melanogaster (Aso et al., 2014). As 
Anderson & Adolphs (2014) note, descriptions of (and inferences from) behavioural 
observations should be separated from conclusions about subjective experience: “animals, 
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like humans, have central emotion states even if they are not consciously aware of them” (p. 
190). In other words, neurophysiological and behavioural evidence of (operationally defined) 
affect-like states in non-human animals need not imply that such states are felt (sentient). 
 
K & B’s challenging proposal urges us to think more deeply about the possibility that insects 
have the capacity for consciousness. If they are right, the obvious next question concerns the 
contents of insect subjective experience and, from an ethical standpoint, whether there is an 
affective component. A number of approaches can build on K & B’s arguments to start 
investigating the possible existence of insect affect and address the inevitable question that 
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